Ergodic mean field games of singular control: beyond Nash equilibria
Despite their popularity, Nash equilibria (NE) are not the only notion of equilibria between competitive rational players. A good alternative is given by coarse correlated equilibria (CCE), as they may lead to higher expected payoffs, thus being more efficient. CCEs feature a moderator who randomly selects a strategy profile for the players, correlating their strategies without requiring them to cooperate. Motivated by a simple model of irreversible investment, we consider a stationary mean field game (MFG) with singular controls and ergodic payoff, in which the representative player interacts with the average of the long-time distribution of the population. For the sake of comparison with the social optima, we solve the stationary mean field control problem with singular controls, which gives an optimal policy of barrier type. Then, we provide simple classes of CCEs in the stationary MFG and draw a comparison between CCEs, NEs and MFC solutions. This talk is based on a joint work with Giorgio Ferrari (University of Bielefeld).
Area: CS2 - Mean Field Games and Mean Field Control I (Jodi Dianetti & Mattia Martini)
Keywords: Mean field games
Please Login in order to download this file